

Review

Prosocial behavior toward machines

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Abstract

Building on the *computers are social actors* framework, we provide an overview of research demonstrating that humans behave prosocially toward machines. In doing so, we outline that similar motivational and cognitive processes play a role when people act in prosocial ways toward humans and machines. These include perceiving the machine as somewhat human, applying social categories to the machine, being socially influenced by the machine, and experiencing social emotions toward the machine. We conclude that studying prosocial behavior toward machines is important to facilitate proper functioning of human–machine interactions. We further argue that machines provide an interesting yet underutilized resource in the study of prosocial behavior because they are both highly controllable and humanlike.

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Keywords

Anthropomorphism, Computers are social actors, Human–machine interaction, Prosocial behavior.

Introduction

Have you ever angrily blamed the computer for producing *yet another* error message during data analysis, knowing full well that it does not possess agency? Or have you ever apologized for getting in the way of a robot vacuum, despite knowing that robots do not have feelings? Humans interact with machines socially, even to the point of showing prosocial behavior, defined as “any type of voluntary behaviour that is intended to help others, while guaranteeing no rewards to the helper and

requiring some kind of cost (e.g. money, time) to the person” [1•, p. 2]. The goal of this review is threefold. First, we will provide an overview of recent studies demonstrating prosocial responses to machines; second, we will highlight similarities in the motivational and cognitive processes underlying prosocial behavior toward humans and machines; and third, we will argue that research on human–machine interaction has interesting practical and methodological implications. To begin, we acquaint the reader with the *computers are social actors* framework [2–4] for understanding social behavior toward machines.

Computers are social actors

In the 1990s, Nass and colleagues conducted a series of experiments that would lay the foundation for the *computers are social actors* framework (hereinafter “CASA”). They followed a simple formula: take an experiment from social psychology, substitute the key people (i.e., those typically played by research confederates) with computers, and run the experiment to test if the original results replicated despite the substitution. Quite often, it would (see [3,4] for reviews). One paradigmatic example comes from a study on reciprocity [5]. Participants first used a computer to conduct a web search that yielded helpful results. Half were then moved to a different computer. Participants then completed a second task where they could spend any amount of time “helping” the computer generate color palettes. Participants seated at their original “helpful” computer spent more time “helping” their computer than those who were moved to a different computer prior to the second task. In other words, people reciprocated help received from computers.

What might explain this social behavior toward the machines? Nass and Moon [3] described social behavior toward machines as *mindless* (see also [4]). They posit that some cues activate social scripts (i.e., expectations for the sequence of events in a particular social setting) and automatic social behavior. Once the script is active, the search for more cues—ones that might reveal the social behavior is inappropriate or not applicable—is terminated. Thus, the automatic social responses occur despite the apparently nonsocial conditions. In short, the CASA framework regards social responses to machines as automatic and cued.

Although initially proposed within the realm of computers, CASA has also been applied in research into robots and virtual agents [6•]. Throughout the article, we will refer collectively to these as “machines.” In the following, we review four psychological processes involved in prosocial behavior toward machines, all of which were identified in the literature on human–human interaction and subsequently extended to machines. As such, each process also illustrates a point of convergence between human-directed and machine-directed prosocial behavior. These processes are (i) perceiving humanness, (ii) social categorization, (iii) social influence, and (iv) affectively motivated prosociality.

Machines are perceived as (somewhat) human

Perceived humanness is a matter of degree, that is, perceptual phenomena are not just categorized as either human or not, but as *more or less* human. In turn, perceived humanness has a major influence on behavior; people who are *dehumanized* are more likely to be aggressed against, whereas, conversely, people who are perceived as more human (e.g., capable of feeling complex emotions) are more likely to receive help [7]. Perceiving humanness also extends to machines as is apparent from the reaction of a colonel viewing a test run of a land mine detection robot: “The colonel just could not stand the pathos of watching the burned, scarred and crippled machine drag itself forward on its last leg. This test, he charged, was *inhumane*” [8, *emphases added*]. In scientific terms, we *anthropomorphize* machines, that is we “imbue the real or imagined behavior of nonhuman agents with humanlike characteristics, motivations, intentions, or emotions” [9, p. 864]. Anthropomorphism functions as a *metaphor*; we apply our vast understanding of humans in order to comprehend a non-human agent “as if” it were a human [9,10]. This is especially true when the agent has a high number of humanlike features or traits or when one has an increased need for either company or for effectively interacting with one’s environment [9]. Anthropomorphism is not necessarily conscious; instead, Kim and Sundar [11] argue that it occurs mindlessly and is thus consistent with CASA.

Anthropomorphism is linked to both prosocial and antisocial behavior toward machines. Recently, Keijsers and Bartneck [12] found a negative relationship between mind attribution—a central part of anthropomorphism—and verbally bullying a robot in a video game. Furthermore, Bartneck *et al.* [13] found that people hesitate longer when switching off an intelligent and agreeable robot compared to an unintelligent and disagreeable one. However, physical manipulations of anthropomorphism such as robot shape and interactivity have received mixed support (see [1•] for a review),

possibly because the relation between physical human-likeness and perceived human-likeness is rather complex; for instance, conflicting machinelike and humanlike cues can make a machine seem eerie or “uncanny” [14]. In sum, to the degree that machines are ascribed humanlike characteristics, they elicit humanlike treatment.

Machines are socially categorized

Humans belong to a variety of different *social categories* (e.g., gender, ethnicity, age group). Whenever these are salient, we use them to guide our judgments, attitudes, and prosocial behavior [15]. Once again, the same is true of machines [16•,17••]. For example, people attribute gender to machines: Siegel *et al.* [18] showed that men donate more money to a female-voiced robot versus a male-voiced robot. Along the same lines, people also apply gender stereotypes. In a study by Eyssel and Hegel [19], participants would rather cooperate on a math task—versus a verbal task—when paired with a male (i.e., short-haired) robot, but showed no preference for task type when paired with a female (i.e., long-haired) robot (see also [20] for a recent conceptual replication). Accordingly, people conform more to the advice of a male compared to a female computer when quizzed on a stereotypically masculine topic [21] (but see [22]).

Besides social categorization, machines may be subject to social identification and the accompanying intergroup biases. Indeed, Fraune [23] demonstrated ingroup favoritism in minimal groups: participants were given a red or blue wristband and assigned to a team of humans and robots with matching colors. Next, they played a game against a differently colored team of humans and robots in which they had to assign noise blasts to all players (including their own teammates). Strikingly, participants administered louder noise blasts to an outgroup human compared to an ingroup robot, indicating that ingroup favoritism extends to robots (see also [17••] for a state-of-the-art review). In addition, Jong *et al.* [24] recently demonstrated that team membership increased elicited empathy toward a robot in an online game. Finally, multiple studies have manipulated ethnic identification, for example, by informing participants that a machine had a foreign versus a familiar name or country of origin [25]. Such studies have found that machines belonging to an ethnic ingroup are anthropomorphized more [25,26] and induce more cooperative behavior [27,28]. In sum, the prosocial treatment of machines depends, in part, on which social categories they are assigned to.

Machines exert social influence

If machines are perceived as somewhat human and are categorized socially, it should come as no surprise that they also elicit *social influence* (i.e., induce behavior change by virtue of their social presence). Of interest,

responses to machines follow the norm of reciprocity (cf. the prior example from [5]). Lee and Liang [29,30] found that people are more willing to help a machine if it provided helpful (versus unhelpful) hints in a prior trivia game. Relatedly, Sandoval et al. [31] found that humans reciprocate the decisions of robots in economic games.

Beyond simple reciprocity, machines exert social influence in a variety of ways. Recently, Lee and Liang [32] demonstrated the foot-in-the-door technique, that is, robots that made an initial small request had greater success at persuading people to commit to a large request. Under conditions of high ambiguity, people feel pressured to conform—and, indeed, do conform—to groups of robots in Asch-like scenarios [33]. There is also preliminary evidence of robots inducing pluralistic ignorance: Connolly et al. [34] recently found that a mistreated robot was more likely to receive help if bystander robots displayed a sad versus a neutral expression. Finally, Riether et al. [35] demonstrated a social facilitation effect, whereby humans perform better in easy tasks and worse in complex tasks if a robot is present versus absent. In sum, machines can induce prosocial treatment via social influence.

Machines evoke emotions

When it comes to machines, most people recognize their capability to arouse emotions, as the opening example of the anger-inducing error messages shows. Interestingly, emotions are complicit in many forms of prosocial behavior—even those directed toward machines. For instance, de Melo et al. [36] demonstrated that compared to humans, people exhibit equally envious behavior toward a computer with a better payoff in an economic game but appear to be less guilt-ridden by exploiting the computer in said game.

The empathy-altruism hypothesis, which implies that empathic concern elicits a motivation to help others [37], has also been replicated with machines. When people are exposed to videos of robot mistreatment (as compared to a neutral video of the robot), they report feeling more pity toward the robot, as well as higher negative affect and lower positive affect [38]. Furthermore, a study using encephalographic measures indicates that a similar empathic response is activated by watching painful videos of human hands compared to robot hands [39]. Crucially, empathic concern toward machines leads to downstream behavior consequences. For example, knowing the background story of a bug robot makes people more hesitant to strike it with a mallet, likely due to increased anthropomorphism and empathic concern [40]. In another example, Briggs and Scheutz [41] had participants watch a robot proudly build a tower before commanding the robot to knock it over. If the robot started sobbing and pleading to keep the tower, participants felt more discomfort and were

more hesitant to insist on their command. Overall, machines and humans alike elicit prosocial behavior through empathic concern.

Implications for future research

Researching human–machine interaction has both practical and methodological implications. In the applied domain, roboticists have already integrated robots into areas such as transportation, health care, and education—a trend that will likely persist (see [42••] for a recent review). However, for machines to properly fulfill their function, they must be treated prosocially. For instance, delivery robots in hospitals rely on nurses and housekeepers for loading and unloading [43]; robot vacuums need help getting un-stuck from furniture [44]; and autonomous vehicles need to be respected in traffic, despite the fact that they brake automatically for jaywalkers [45]. Thus, it is important to understand and foster prosocial behavior toward machines. Indeed, encouraging any kind of prosocial behavior may be an end in itself [1•].

As for methodological implications, Wykowska [46•] recently argued for the use of robots in social cognition research, stating,

Robots can be informative with respect to understanding the human mind because they can be tools to study social cognition through their embodied physical (and perhaps even social) presence, which provides higher ecological validity than screen-based stimuli and better experimental control than human–human interaction. (p. 1).

The present review suggests that similar processes underlie human-directed and machine-directed prosocial behavior. As such, it seems reasonable to suggest that machines can be applied in the service of understanding human-directed prosociality (see [47] for similar reasoning). Like Wykowska [46•], we argue that machine behavior is more controlled than research confederate behavior and arguably more ecologically valid than primitive stimuli. In addition, using machines as “research confederates” eliminates the need for blinding procedures, possibly reduces the need for deception (see [48]), and makes more experimental procedures morally permissible, such as Milgram’s obedience paradigm [49] (but see [50]). In the future, machines might even allow for reliable manipulation of complex variables such as human-likeness and mind attribution, which are central in areas such as social cognition research or moral psychology. Finally, the CASA framework asserts that behavior toward machines is mindless; thus, applying machines might allow the researcher to focus on the automatic aspects of prosocial behavior. In sum, applying machines has the potential to enrich the “tool kit” of prosociality researchers.

Conclusion

For thirty years, researchers have used evidence from (social) psychology as a means to improve the design of robots, computers, and more. Despite this, going in the opposite direction and applying machines (or findings from human–machine interaction) to the study of human behavior seems to be a rare occurrence. This is unfortunate, as there are clear similarities between how people interact with other humans and how they interact with machines. With regard to prosocial behavior, these similarities include diverse topics such as dehumanization, stereotypes, intergroup biases, norms, social influence, and empathy. At the same time, applying machines in research allows for highly controllable, human-like, and more ethically viable research confederates. Although machines have already been applied to the study of social cognition [46•], this conclusion leaves plenty of unexplored territory for psychologists to map out. In fact, we contend that studying prosocial behavior toward machines has a unique and untapped potential for testing theories. For instance, in the context of empathy, one can experimentally vary stereotypical appearance and behavior of a human-like robot along central dimensions (e.g., warmth, competence) and test under which conditions people behave most empathically toward the robot. Similarly, in the context of dehumanization, one can study which features (e.g., appearance, agency) are conducive to the attribution of humanness [46•]. Finally, in the context of aggression, one can study highly harmful aggressive behavior, as seen in Milgram's obedience paradigm [49] (harming machines, however, introduces new ethical concerns because doing so is often unpleasant to the actor [50]).

With these opportunities in mind, we wish to identify some challenges for future research. First, not all interactions with machines are mindless (e.g., [51]). Similarly, some prosocial behavior (e.g., teaching a child how to tie their shoes) might only occur mindfully. Thus, understanding the boundary conditions of how prosocial behavior is related to the CASA framework is necessary. Second, many studies within the field of human–machine interaction apply small sample sizes [1•], and future research should seek to apply larger samples and to preregister confirmatory research. Third, we have stressed the similarities, but it is equally important to recognize the differences between human-directed and machine-directed prosociality. There is plenty of evidence that people discriminate between humans and machines (e.g., [36,49]), and the researcher can expect smaller effect sizes when applying machines instead of humans—machines are perceived as no more than *somewhat* human. Finally, as technology evolves, the CASA framework faces new challenges. Compared to at the time of its conception, the CASA of today must account for longer, more complex interactions between ever more experienced machine users and increasingly

anthropomorphic machines (see [6•]). Surely, interesting times lie ahead for the study of prosocial behavior toward machines.

Conflict of interest statement

Nothing declared.

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